

ARTICLE

Talent Management in Indonesian National Armed Force: Addressing Personnel Bottlenecks

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ABSTRACT

Over the years, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) has been tasked with upholding state sovereignty and national defence. However, TNI also faces a bottleneck among its middle- and high-ranking officers, leading to excess non-job personnel. Without corresponding promotion adjustments, the current policy will affect the institution's performance and officers' careers. This study applied qualitative research by conducting interviews and gathering primary and secondary data through focused group discussion and literature review from various policy documents and reports. The findings then highlight the solutions with talent management emerging as a strategic approach. It offers a second-best policy option by promoting professionalism and modernity while addressing organisational challenges. Through this approach, we tried to propose evidence-based solutions to improve organisational performance and address personnel bottleneck issues. This study proposes a new approach to talent management strategies. It involves recruiting, developing, and retaining high-potential individuals and optimising functional positions based on expertise to offer an alternative career path. The talent management approach also aims to enhance efficiency and effectiveness within military organisations.

A. INTRODUCTION

During 77 years, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) have experienced changes from nomenclature changes to regional structure and combat power. This cannot be separated from the perspective of defence politics and Indonesia's threat characteristics so far. Based on history, Indonesia has hardly experienced a large-scale threat since the Revolutionary War, confrontation with Malaysia, and regional uprisings. TNI's main task is upholding state sovereignty, defending Indonesia's territorial based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and protecting the entire nation and land from threats and intrusion to the nation's integrity. One of the issues in career patterns within TNI is the bottleneck phenomenon for middle and high-rank officers. It occurred because there were too many middle- and high-ranking officers, and there were limited posts for them to occupy. This disproportionate number is also found in police units (Ridha & Wijaya, 2020), which makes many officers "non-jobs" and affects organisational performance. This surplus case occurred around 2015-2016 when some officers were given horizontal transfer (Supriatma, 2019). It also happened in mid-April 2020, when

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TNI Commander Decree Number Kep/385/IV/2020 was issued regarding the transfer of 329 high-ranking officers. This is the largest wave of transfers compared to the previous period, with only 110-150 officers. The decree regulates the shifting at the identical rank of colonel-brigadier general level and equivalent.

[Ginting \(2018\)](#) reported around 150 colonels and 70 high-ranking officers in Special Staff positions for the Army Chief. In this report, several high-ranking officers had been in a non-job condition for up to four years. On the minus side, those who become Special Staff of the Chief of the Force are not only those who have completed their education. Seniors with problems and legal records were also gathered under the same non-job conditions. This situation occurs in the Navy and Air Force down to the most minor units in the region. In addition, Special Staff also have differences with Expert Staff who have duties and positions, so position allowances follow them. Exceptional staff do not have it, requiring TNI to manage its human resources well.

The bottleneck phenomenon is an issue that has long existed within TNI and the police. In the 1980s, Armed Forces Commander General LB Moerdani attempted to streamline the posture of the Indonesian military. It became even more complex when the 1998 reform took place, and political changes also affected TNI since ABRI's dual function was abolished. It was carried out during the New Order era, allowing the officers' placement in the civilian sphere. Starting from Governor, Minister, and Director General of Ministry, the positions are filled by one-star to three-star general posts. At that time, placing officers in government structures was part of personnel development ([Santoso, 2018](#)). This must then be instilled in graduates of the Military Academy after 2000, who must know that the opportunity to become a general is not as wide as it was during the New Order era. The sudden reforms meant TNI did not have enough time to make anticipatory efforts. In addition, prolonging the retirement age for officers from 55 to 58 years has increased the burden on personnel training.

The research about military organisations in Indonesia is primarily concerned with the political conflict between military and civilian elites. Previous research from [Hadi \(2018\)](#) concluded that TNI career development is still focused on Structural Positions (*Jabatan Structural*), which tend to be limited, and Functional Positions (*Jabatan Fungsional*) have not been seen as an alternative to career development and development for the soldiers and shows problems with unideal organisational structure ([Mukhtas & Sutiyo, 2019](#)). Other research from the Police unit by [Ridha & Wijaya \(2020\)](#) shed bottleneck phenomenon has negative implications for implementing their duties and functions as public servants. Meanwhile, the research focusing on military personnel management and development is still limited. There remains a gap in studies regarding comprehensive solutions to the bottleneck phenomenon. The existing policies have provided temporary relief but failed to address the root cause of the issue. Transitioning to the post-reform era brought new challenges, necessitating an innovative personnel management and development approach. This study aims to fill the academic gap by exploring and proposing solutions to improve officer career patterns through talent management (TM) strategies. By leveraging insights from previous research on talent management and adapting them to the unique context of TNI, this research offers evidence-based recommendations to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of TNI's organisational structure. It also aims to provide actionable insights for policymakers, leaders, and practitioners involved, especially in military organisations.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Human resources in the organisation include all people who actively work in it. Human resource management is related to various activities such as selection, recruitment, training, development, payroll, evaluation, employee promotion and termination of employment ([Rao, 2019](#); [Wilkinson, 2022](#)). Large-scale organisations have human resource departments

responsible for recruitment, selection, education and training, performance management, talent management, rewards, and employee relations (Wilkinson, 2022). They focused on employees as resources that contribute to delivering performance. Its trends now focus on individual practices that ensure employees' ability and motivation to work effectively. Military organisations are vulnerable to facing high consequences of crises, especially in human factors and organisational and cultural dimensions (Ali & Al-Aali, 2016; Gabrielli et al., 2019). Human resources is crucial to organisational management, even in military organisations. It has such aspects as recruitment, training, development, and maintenance of personnel to achieve its goals. Military organisations are under exceptional pressure to impose certainty on ambiguous, dangerous, swiftly changing, and highly consequential conditions of instrumental action (Hasselbladh & Ydén, 2020). It is characterised by being influenced by formal mechanisms designed to improve organisational expertise. This includes doctrine, professional training, socialisation, specialised technical knowledge, and competency standards in various specialities (Hasselbladh & Ydén, 2020; Holmberg & Alvinus, 2019; Ruffa, 2017). In addition, the professional nature of military interactions is embodied in the selectivity logic. They establish specific relevance criteria and approaches to make complex situations actionable from a military perspective.

A frequent complaint about bureaucracies is they waste resources by employing too many people. Overstaffing refers to employing individuals who do not actively contribute to the organisation's productivity in a fixed context. Bottlenecks or overstaffing happens because the number of recruits exceeds the number of employees who retire (Ford, 2017; Hvide & Zhang, 2021). There is a mistake in understanding the staffing function where civil and military organisations add many people to overcome inefficient organisations (Drucker, 1980). Overstaffing is just as challenging as understaffing because it will affect organisational performance. Paying employees for idle time can also result in a substantial financial crisis without well-defined and strategic long-term goals (Ogbodo et al., 2023).

The meaning of "talent" has experienced several developments in the management scope. Hollingworth (1926) defines talent as a unique personal intellectual type. Some individuals require special attention and unusual behaviour when they develop their "gift" through intuition, memory, the ability to imagine, how to fantasise and focus attention, associate, and logical reason (Tabor-Blazewicz, 2013). Another approach regards talent as combining one or more human resource idiosyncrasies, such as attitudes and behaviour. The exclusive approach views the potential for high-value talent as beneficial to the organisation's future and productivity in the context of individual roles (CIPD, 2021; Iles et al., 2010).


Meanwhile, the inclusive approach considers all employees as talents based on systems and personal interactions for sustainable competitiveness in the long term (Iles, 2008; Swailes et al., 2014). The hybrid approach divides employees into several groups that are identified more specifically with a general ethos of good HR management (Boudreau, 2013; Ulrich & Smallwood, 2012). The definition of talent will influence the measurement and pattern of HR management.

Lembaga Administrasi Negara (2020a) maps out conditions where the agency requires talent management, namely (a) Essential positions are often vacant for too long after the previous holder leaves, (b) the organisation is in a critical situation, losing significant competence/ skill if essential employees leave, (c) employees feel that the agency has not tried to develop employee competence or expertise, (d) there is almost no budget allocated to employee development activities, (e) there is no increase in agency performance, (f) the employees do not know whether they deserve to be the successors of a particular position, and (g) Employees do not know how their careers will progress in the next 5, 10, or 15 years.

Collings and Mellahi (2009) define talent management (TM) as activities and processes that involve systemic identification of critical positions that contribute differently to the organisation, whether filled by competent incumbents or new talent pools with high potential who have high commitment to the organisation. TM requires targeted human resource policies designed to increase the talent pool. From the exclusive point of view, talent pools are often identified through HR management measurements and interventions specifically targeted at them, such as learning opportunities and retention bonuses (Iles et al., 2010). TM practices in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand include talent recruitment, development, and retention and have various schemes (Poocharoen & Lee, 2013). TM was first famous in the private sector.

Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the implementation of national civil servant TM and functional position arrangements are included in the policy and strategy direction of bureaucratic reform and governance. TM is one of the strengthening elements in the civil service merit system. The merit system career pattern emphasises competence, qualifications, performance, fairness and openness (Rakhmawanto, 2018).

TM consists of the identification, development, engagement/retention and deployment of employees considered valuable to the organisation (CIPD, 2021; Hongal & Kinange, 2020; Iles, 2008). They generally show high potential in the future because they fulfil a business/operations-critical role. Meanwhile, Collings & Mellahi (2009) define TM as activities and processes that involve systemic identification of critical positions that contribute differently to the organisation, whether occupied by competent incumbents or new talent pools with high potential who still have a high commitment to the organisation. Therefore, TM requires targeted human resource policies to enhance the talent pool. In an exclusive view, talent pools are often identified through HR management measures and interventions specifically targeted at them, such as learning opportunities and retention bonuses (Hongal & Kinange, 2020; Iles et al., 2010). An inclusive approach views TM as identifying each person's capabilities and opportunities for growth and maximising capital in organisational structures and systems.



(Source: Caruso (2012))

Figure 1. 9-Box Grid Measurement Method

One of the most familiar measurements used in TM is the nine-box grid from Caruso (2012), where employees are assessed based on performance and potential and then placed in the categories in Figure 1. TM is the way to manage a group of succession plans to be developed and promoted to fill organisational strategic positions. The succession plan group is a group of

employees considered more skillful in occupying the target position. The nine-box grid can be adapted to the needs of the organisation. Employees are divided into two criteria and three levels of attribution: potential (low, medium, high level) and performance appraisal (low, medium, high level). Employees will then be given different treatments according to their attribution: Talent Recruitment, Talent Development, and Talent Retention (Davis et al., 2016). Military institutions face unique challenges in managing their personnel's careers. TM in this context involves strategies for identifying, developing and utilising individual talents to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisational structure. This discussion of TM provides an essential foundation for understanding how military institutions manage and overcome various challenges faced in the career development of their personnel.

C. METHOD

This qualitative study, employing a descriptive approach, uses the data obtained by interviews with officers in the Ministry of Defense and National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia from Focused Group Discussion (FGD) organised by the Directorate of Defense and Security Studies and Geography of the National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia. In addition, it is also supported by secondary sources of data from the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Commander in Chief's Regulations or Decree, Regulations on Career Patterns within TNI, TM Roadmap in Indonesia, and previous research related to TM and bottleneck phenomenon in organisations spanning from 2017 to present. Furthermore, it seeks to address the challenges associated with personnel development, aiming to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the TNI organisational structure.

D. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Recent Condition of HR Management and Policy in TNI

TNI consists of three forces, Army, Navy and Air Force and is led by a Commander, while a Chief of Staff leads each force. During the Guided Democracy until the New Order period, TNI was merged with the POLRI (State Police of the Republic of Indonesia), known as ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*-Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia). By People's Consultative Assembly Decree (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat-MPR*) number VI/MPR/2000 on the split between TNI and POLRI and MPR Decree number VII/MPR/2000 on TNI and POLRI roles, since August 2000 the two units then separated. The official name of the Indonesian military also changed from ABRI to TNI. Three new laws and regulations were formed: Law Number 2 of 2002 on POLRI, Law Number 3 of 2002 on National Defense, and Law Number 34 of 2004 on TNI. TNI's political rights and ABRI's dual function were eliminated.

As a state tool in defense, TNI must supported by an adequate central weapons system, budget and personnel. Based on the [International Institute for Strategic Studies \(IISS\) report \(2022\)](#), Indonesian soldiers occupy the 7th position in Asia with 395,500 active members total in 2021. The active members are divided into three forces: Army (300,400 personnel), Navy (65,000 personnel), and Air Force (30,100 personnel). Apart from that, reserve components are estimated at 400,000 personnel and active military around 280,000 personnel, bringing the total number of soldiers to 1,075,500 personnel. With such a number, TNI has become Southeast Asia's most significant armed force. This large number of personnel requires to have various abilities when on duty. TNI career pattern is part of personnel development to achieve task fulfilment and is regulated in Commander Regulation Perpang/18/III/2011 on Technical Guidelines for Soldier Career Patterns at TNI Headquarters. The career pattern in TNI needs to be regulated to see the development and progress open to soldiers to get positions,

promotions and educational opportunities for officers, non-commissioned officers and privates in the ranks of TNI Headquarters. Before discussing further, Table 1 below shows the rank system for Middle and High Officers in TNI.

Table 1. Middle and High-rank Officer Levels in TNI

Level	Army Force	Navy Force	Air Force
High-rank Officer	General	Admiral	Marshal
	Lieutenant General	Vice Admiral	Vice Marshal
	Major General	Rear Admiral	Young Marshal
	Brigadier General	First Admiral	First Marshal
Middle-rank Officer	Colonel	Colonel	Colonel
	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel
	Major	Major	Major

Source: Regulation number 39 year 2010 concerning the Armed Forces (2010)

Based on Table 1, Officers with the rank of Major and above certainly have good experience in academic and military fields. To be promoted from Major to Lieutenant Colonel, you must fulfil the Officer Service Period (*Masa Dinas Perwira-MDP*) of 16 years and complete the Command and Staff School (*Sekolah Staf dan Komando-Sesko*) education. Those at the high-ranking officer level with a minimum MDP of 22 years generally attend education at Sesko TNI. This is the highest level of education for those graduating from the Military Academy or Career Soldier Officers (*Perwira Prajurit Karier-PAPK TNI*). Before taking education at Sesko TNI, the officer must have previously passed the education at Sesko AD/Sesko AL/Sesko AU while still holding a Major rank. The selection process is carried out strictly and transparently, so not everyone who registers can proceed to the next stage. Sesko TNI graduates usually occupy strategic positions in TNI and the Ministry of Defense, e.g. TNI Commander and Chief of Staff. On several occasions, the middle and high-ranking officers also participated in Regular Courses held by the National Resilience Institute. Generally, middle and high-ranking officers have high competence, and much effort must be made to avoid becoming non-job officers. The detailed procedure related to education, service period and rank of soldiers is regulated in TNI Commander Regulation Number 40 of 2018 on Ranks of Indonesian National Armed Force Soldiers.

Bottleneck problems are common in organisations with many employees, including TNI. Effective staff management does not complement the significant number of middle and high-ranking officers, resulting in excess non-job officers. Several findings explain why personnel bottlenecks are still encountered within TNI. The extension of the lifespan of high-ranking officers caused the personnel bottleneck problem. 2011-2017, approximately 30 generals and 330 colonels were unemployed (Laksmana et al., 2020). By 2019, according to the Head of the TNI Information Center, Major Gen. Sisriadi, at least hundreds of middle and high-ranking officers who do not have structural positions consist of 150 high-ranking officers (general) and 500 middle-ranking officers (colonel). It is due to the policy of increasing the retirement age without following changes to the provisions for officer promotion. Initially, the retirement age limit for TNI officers was 55 years, which was later increased to 58 years, increasing the burden on personnel training. Not only that, but this policy has also left many non-job officers unemployed.

The solution so far is organisational expansion by adding more structures, regional units, combat units and other military units. As a result, many positions have increased in status and position space in the lower-level structure. This is in contrast to the management under General Benny Moerdani, who streamlined the structure of TNI. The Regional Military Commands, which initially numbered 16 units, were reduced to 10, while the three units of Regional

Defense Commands were also removed. Kodam has reached 15 units, while Kowilhan has been revived with the new name Joint Regional Defense Command. This was done to provide a new space for non-job Military High Officers. So, it is unsurprising that military observers consider the TNI structure like other military organisations: overstaffing, outdated managerial practices, and excessively hierarchical and top-heavy organisational structure (Ashraf & Uddin, 2015).

After the reform era, the end of ABRI's dual function meant that TNI personnel no longer held strategic government positions. But, according to Law Number 34 of 2004, TNI is still allowed to occupy positions in 10 ministries/institutions (1) Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs; (2) Ministry of Defense; (3) Presidential Military Secretariat; (4) State Intelligence Agency; (5) National Crypto Agency; (6) National Resilience Institute; (7) National Resilience Council; (8) National Search and Rescue Agency; (9) National Narcotics Agency; and (10) Supreme Court. It turns out that the deployment of TNI members to those institutions has not resolved the personnel bottleneck problem. Attached is a list of active TNI Soldiers assigned to ministries/agencies in certain positions.

Table 2. Distribution of TNI Soldiers Holding Civilian Positions in Certain Central Agencies

Certain Central Agencies Based on TNI Law	Certain Central Agencies are already filled with Active TNI soldiers	Number of Active Soldiers distributed
Coordinating Ministry for Politic, Law, and Security Affairs	Coordinating Ministry for Politic, Law, and Security Affairs	67
Ministry of Defense	Ministry of Defense	887
Presidential Military Secretariat	Presidential Military Secretariat	60
State Intelligence Agency	State Intelligence Agency	225
National Crypto Agency	National Crypto Agency	8
National Resilience Institute	National Resilience Institute	110
<i>Wantannas</i>	National Resilience Council	34
Search and Rescue (SAR) <i>Nasional</i>	National Search and Rescue Agency (regulated in Presidential Decree Number 83 of 2016)	8
National Narcotics Agency	National Narcotics Agency	1
Supreme Court	Supreme Court	81
	Maritime Security Agency (regulated in Presidential Regulation Number 178 of 2014)	71
	National Counter-Terrorism Agency (regulated in Presidential Regulation Number 1 of 2019)	10
	National Disaster Management Agency (regulated in Regulation President Number 1 of 2019)	1
Total Soldiers in Certain Civil Agencies		1.563

Source: Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional (2019)

Based on Table 2, central institutions have been developed, and TNI soldiers with civilian positions have been distributed. Apart from that, there are several central institutions where it is still possible for active TNI soldiers to occupy civilian positions in other ministries/institutions that require their role. The following table shows the Distribution of the Number of TNI Soldiers Holding Civilian Positions in Certain Central Agencies outside the provisions of TNI Law.

Table 3 Distribution of the Number of TNI Soldiers Holding Civilian Positions in Certain Central Agencies outside the provisions of TNI Law

Certain Central Agencies outside the Provisions of TNI Law	Number of Active Soldiers distributed
Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs	10
Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture	1
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries	2
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources	2
Ministry of Transportation	13
Pancasila Ideology Development Agency	1
Total Soldiers in Certain Civil Agencies	29

Source: Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional (2019)

According to [Tempo.co \(2019\)](#), although the officer distribution is already done, you can still find hundreds of middle and high-ranking officers who do not have structural positions in the Ministry of Defense. The number of high-ranking TNI officers has increased due to the lack of positions. The data states that there are only 636 positions for high-ranking officers, even though the recent number of personnel is 777 people. So, there are around 141 high-ranking officers without positions. At the colonel level, there are 3,485 positions.

Meanwhile, the number of personnel in this rank is 4,275 people. So, There are 790 personnel who do not occupy any positions. Meanwhile, positions ranging from Lieutenant Colonel to Lieutenant tend to be safe. During President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's reign, new positions and units were created. The type of Military Resort Command (*Komando Resor Militer-Korem*) is divided into type A and type B. Type A Korem Commander held by Brigadier General. Of course, there will be budgetary consequences related to the formation of this new combat unit. The rank level for several positions has also been increased; for example, the assistant to the Kostrad Commander, a Brigadier General, can now hold the colonel previously held. One of them is contained in Law Number 34 of 2004 on TNI, which allows its members to occupy structural positions in 10 civilian agencies, as stated before. This could be one solution so middle and high-rank officers do not burden TNI institutions regarding personnel. Apart from the data shown in Table 2 and Table 3, recently, there have been issues regarding placing TNI in positions at the Corruption Eradication Commission Correctional Institutions and the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government ([Sucipto, 2015](#)). Minister Luhut Binsar Panjaitan also proposed changes to TNI Law, so their officers could be assigned to several ministries and institutions. This is intended for those high-ranking officers to fill unnecessary positions no longer. They also do not need to fight for positions because they can have a career outside the military.

Apart from creating new posts, another solution is to allow military officers to hold positions outside military agencies and be limited to some ministries. Even though TNI Law regulates the agencies they can join, a proposed revision of Article 47 paragraph 2 of TNI Law is proposed. According to presidential policy, the position of active soldiers has been expanded to several other ministries that require the energy and expertise of active soldiers. This proposal then had the impact of returning ABRI's dual function and demotivating long-serving civil servants in the ministry. If we look back at the past, TNI (ABRI) not only had duties in the defence field but also to maintain political stability and security. At that time, almost all middle-to high-ranking officials came from the military, including regents, governors, ministers, and officials in ministries. This dual role causes the army to become a political tool to perpetuate power and control society. Their return to civilian positions could potentially damage the democratic system and societal freedoms. The military does not work in a democratic but rather a hierarchical command system. When state administration involves active soldiers, the democratic system and functions do not work optimally. This issue is a pretty sensitive topic

and is considered unfair because it can cause demotivation for long-serving civil servants in the ministry/institution. The placement of officers in several agencies other than those listed in TNI Law is expected to strain civil-military relations and impact demotivating agency employees.

This will enable the commander to overcome the bottleneck and avoid deviations in staff management. This iceberg phenomenon is only a symptom and not a real problem, so former solutions and policies will only be helpful in the short term. Without solving the root of the problem, it could become a time bomb in the future. TNI asked to focus on more systemic and below-the-surface problems. Implementing TM in TNI is a recommended strategic effort to modernise the career system. TNI members received promotions through seniority, connection closeness, and automatic promotions. So, in the future, management must improve the organisational typology, echelons of positions, and socio-political functions of TNI. It is recommended that TNI leaders need innovation in personnel management and professional career patterns.

TNI Talent Management in Addressing Personnel Bottlenecks

TNI is a state tool in the defence sector that carries out duties based on state policies and political decisions. As a means of national defence, TNI functions as (1) a deterrent against all forms of military threats and armed threats from abroad and within the country against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and safety of the nation; (2) take action against every form of threat in point (1); and (3) restoring state security conditions disturbed due to security chaos. Their main task is to uphold state sovereignty, defend the territorial integrity of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and protect the nation from threats and troubles to the nation and state integrity. To be able to carry out these main tasks, TNI soldiers are required to be professionals with high performance. This condition requires TNI to prepare its soldiers for high professionalism and performance, especially at the middle and high-rank officer levels. TM can prepare succession candidates to fill positions with particular skills. By adopting TM from Davis et al. (2016) and the nine-box grid from Caruso (2012), TNI TM can be mapped as follows.



(Source: Caruso (2012))

Figure 2. Nine-box Grid Scenario on TM Strategies

Table 4. Talent Management Category and Recommendations

Box	Category	Recommendation
9	Performance above expectations and high potential	1. Promoted and retained 2. Institutional/National Talent Pool 3. Award
8	Performance meets expectations and high potential	1. Maintained 2. Talent Pool 3. Job rotation/expansion of positions 4. Performance Guidance
7	Performance above expectations and medium potential	1. Maintained 2. Talent Pool 3. Job rotation/enrichment 4. Competency Development 5. Schoolwork
6	Performance below expectations and high potential	1. Suitable placement 2. Performance Guidance 3. Performance counseling
5	Performance meets expectations and medium potential	1. Suitable placement 2. Performance Guidance 3. Competency development
4	Performance above expectations and low potential	1. Job rotation 2. Competency development
3	Performance below expectations and medium potential	1. Performance Guidance 2. Performance counseling 3. Competency development 4. Suitable placement
2	Performance meets expectations and low potential	1. Performance Guidance 2. Competency development 3. Suitable placement
1	Performance below expectations and low potential	Processed by statutory provisions: reassign or early retirement

Source: Author's results (2023) based on [Caruso \(2012\)](#) and [Davis et al. \(2016\)](#)

a. Talent Recruitment

Proper employee recruitment will directly impact the organisation's and work unit's performance ([Lembaga Administrasi Negara RI, 2020b](#)). There needs to be a process of sorting and selecting TNI members based on their potential, intelligence, and personality. Competency must also be considered when making demands for positions and additional tasks and calculating work performance. Previous research from [Nugraha et al. \(2023\)](#) shows the problems in the selection process for Military Academy Cadets in 2020, where the achievement of targets in quality is lower than the achievement of targets in quantity. This is because the merit system has not been implemented correctly in the recruitment and selection process for the Cadets. If this continues, adaptive and professional personnel cannot be realised. The merit system adheres to the tenets of fairness, ensuring equitable treatment and opportunities for all Indonesian citizens, accountability, and recruitment and selection activities are conducted with moral responsibility and adherence to prevailing regulations. These practices affirm that cadets' recruitment and selection policy has been formulated with commitment to the merit system. Nine-box grid talent mapping can be implemented for new military cadets after they pass the exam. This talent mapping can also be done for active TNI soldiers. Those who meet boxes 7 and 8 in this process will enter the talent pool, and members who occupy the 9 boxes as promotion priority will be re-selected by considering their track record, integrity and morality.

b. Talent Development

Talent Development is carried out to prepare talents to occupy positions deemed appropriate to their abilities. This is taken from the results of the nine-box grid assessment for

those who received recommendations for competency development. This process involves education and training within TNI or other possible corporate university models. For example, it involves members developing leadership training competencies and functional position training within TNI, courses, or learning assignments. Middle and high-rank officers who occupy box 1 are at risk because they have low potential and performance. The option given is to reassign to another post so that you can see whether the employee has suitable potential in another field. Another option is to offer early retirement so as not to burden the organisation. Box 2-6 officers are those with performance below expectations and low to medium level potential who will be intervened as needed. Possible activities include the transfer process, special assignments, providing training and coaching programs, and transferring duties to functional positions of specific expertise. Box 7 and 8 officers have the second priority for promotion, are given learning or competency development tasks, and are included in the agency's succession plan. Implementing TM at this level will determine the best candidates for the talent pool. Box 9 officers are rising stars or employees who occupy talent pool positions. This employee occupies the main position if promotional action is needed because he is considered capable. The recommended actions for 'the rising star' are promotion and retention in the organisation, inclusion in agency or national succession plans, and awards.

c. Talent Retention

Talent retention is an activity that retains talent through monitoring, rewards, and succession management to prepare the personnel for position placement. It is carried out to maintain maximum performance. Examples of actions that can be taken are monitoring and evaluating the performance and capacity of talented people and assigning strategic tasks (such as Technical Executor or Daily Executor), special envoys, and other challenging tasks. As previously explained, building a TM information system in TNI and personnel mapping are also necessary. At a minimum, this information system should contain personal data, qualification records, position track records, competencies, competency development history, records of work assessment results, and other relevant personnel information. This will make it easier for agencies to map member capabilities and plan competency development.

Talents selected as candidates will be responsible for ensuring the organisation can overcome future challenges. The selection of candidates must be carried out carefully, and then training and development must be provided to provide them with the skills and competencies needed in future environments. The intervention actions for employees in boxes 2-6 regarding transferring duties to functional positions are necessary to develop functional positions within TNI based on expertise in specific fields. The regulations regarding functional positions within TNI have been included in Presidential Regulation Number 37 of 2019 on Functional Positions in the Indonesian National Army. So, specific functions in TNI, such as Military Doctors, Military Judges, Engineers, Instructors, etc., do not need to occupy managerial positions (commander) to be promoted. This functional position is regulated to answer organisational and environmental challenges affecting TNI, including scientific developments. Apart from the existing functional positions, the nomenclature of other positions with strategic value can be developed, such as Ideology Analyst, Defense and Security Instructor (Defence, Security, Conflict Mediator, and others according to organisational needs). The relationship between managerial and functional positions is a dual system, meaning that the two are compatible (equal in rank) and can occupy positions in a zig-zag pattern. This can be seen in article 18 of Presidential Decree Number 32 of 2019. Paragraph 1 points a and b: "Transfer of soldiers is carried out between TNI functional positions within one family of positions or appointment within positions structural". This program aims to accelerate the performance of TNI and strengthen its new image as an integrity, professional, and modern institution.

E. CONCLUSION

Over 77 years, TNI has adapted to changing defence politics and threats in Indonesia. Tasked with state sovereignty and defence, it relies heavily on personnel, requiring effective human resource management. Yet, a persistent bottleneck arises due to the extension of retirement age without corresponding promotion adjustments, especially with high and middle-ranking officers. This excess of non-job officers significantly decreases organisational performance. Attempts to address this through organisational expansion offer short-term relief but fail to tackle the root problem. Deploying TNI officers to civilian roles has not fully resolved the bottleneck, raising concerns about civil-military relations and employee demotivation. TNI needs systemic, long-term solutions that consider organisational structure and functions.

TM emerges as a strategic solution involving recruitment, development, and retention. Implementing such strategies can identify and nurture high-potential individuals. Creating functional positions based on expertise offers an alternative career path, reducing reliance on managerial roles. Modernising the career system through innovative personnel management is essential for TNI's efficiency. It underscores the significance of creative approaches, specifically TM strategies, in addressing the issue. The proposed solutions, including talent recruitment, development, and retention, offer a comprehensive framework for enhancing TNI's organisational efficiency and effectiveness. While considering budget implications, implementing TM and strategic functional positions is considered a viable alternative to address the bottleneck, superior to structural expansion or adding new units. The study contributes to the academic discourse on military organisation and personnel management by offering practical solutions to complex organisational challenges, thereby advancing knowledge and understanding.

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